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COMMENTS
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: CONSTITUTIONAL PARAMETERS FOR
THE ULTIMATE PENALTY
I. INTRODUCTION
Four years after Furman v. Georgia,1 the Supreme Court has resolved the
major question left unanswered by that decision - does capital punish-
ment per se constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
eighth amendment?' The Court also announced the statutory standards
which satisfy Furman's requirement that the death penalty not be imposed
arbitrarily or capriciously. 3 By a 7-2 vote, the Court held that the imposi-
tion of the death penalty for murder did not per se constitute cruel and
unusual punishment.4 By the same vote, the Court upheld the capital
sentencing statutes of Georgia, Florida and Texas, 5 noting that arbitrary
and capricious infliction of the death penalty can be avoided "by a care-
fully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given
adequate information and guidance."I By a 5-4 vote, the Court invalidated
North Carolina's and Louisiana's mandatory death penalty statutes, hold-
ing that the eighth amendment required consideration of individual char-
1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." The Supreme Court held in
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1972), that the eighth amendment applies to the
states through the fourteenth amendment.
3. The Court's per curiam opinion in Furman stated: "The Court holds that the imposition
and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." 408 U.S. at 239-40. The Court's
opinion was followed by five majority opinions-Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White
and Marshall, and four dissenting opinions-Chief Justice Burger, Justices Blackmun, Powell
and Rehnquist. Although a consensus was not reached, an expression of the five-man major-
ity's common denominator may be found in Justice White's conclusion in his concurring
opinion that the death penalty as imposed was unconstitutional since "there is no meaningful
basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many
cases in which it is not." Id. at 313. The Court did not hold that capital punishment per se
violated the eighth amendment, since three members of the majority dealt only with the
discretionary aspects of the challenged statutes.
4. On the same day the Court announced its decisions in five separate cases. Gregg v.
Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 96 S. Ct. 2960 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 96
S. Ct. 2950 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 96 S. Ct. 2978 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana,
96 S. Ct. 3001 (1976).
5. See note 4 supra.
6. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. at 2935.
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acteristics of the offender and the circumstances of the offense.7 These
decisions also have had the effect of invalidating statutes imposing a man-
datory death penalty, including Virginia's current capital punishment
statute which was held unconstitutional by the Circuit Court of Loudoun
County on October 14, 1976.8
For now, the legal debate over the death penalty's constitutionality has
been silenced, since the majority in the Gregg opinions clearly recognized
the penalty's constitutional status. Nevertheless, the inability of capital
punishment's constitutional supporters and opponents on the Court, in
both Furman and Gregg, to marshall conclusive arguments to underpin
their separate opinions, reflected rightful judicial and societal discomfort
in dealing with this unique penalty.' The Court faced the dilemma of
delimiting the parameters of the current eighth amendment standard of
judicial review19 and subjecting a penalty with at least professed public
acceptance to its judicial scrutiny. The net result was that the penalty's
ultimate acceptance or rejection has been left up to those responsible for
its infliction. This comment will examine the Court's standards for review-
ing the constitutionality of the death penalty, including an examination
of the types of capital punishment statutes which now meet those stan-
dards.
II. THE Furman AND Gregg STANDARDS
The five concurring justices in Furman concluded that the untrammeled
discretion granted to judges and juries in imposing capital sentences re-
sulted in the imposition of the death sentence upon a selected few offend-
ers. Only Justices Brennan and Marshall concluded that capital punish-
ment per se violates the eighth amendment. From previous Supreme Court
decisions," Justice Brennan in Furman reasoned that the eighth amend-
ment principally proscribes penalties that are "degrading to the dignity
7. See note 4 supra. Subsequently the Court also overturned Oklahoma's mandatory death
penalty statute. Williams v. Oklahoma, 96 S. Ct. 3218 (1976); Justus v. Oklahoma, 96 S. Ct.
3216 (1976).
8. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-10 (Repl. Vol. 1975), -31 (Cum. Supp. 1976). For the text of
these sections pertaining directly to the death penalty see note 94 infra.
9. The death penalty is unique in its severity and its irrevocability. Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. at 286-91 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring).
10. As Chief Justice Burger noted in his dissent in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 375-76:
There is no novelty in being called upon to interpret a constitutional provision that is
less than self-defining, but, of all our fundamental guarantees, the ban on 'cruel and
unusual punishments' is one of the most difficult to translate into judicially managea-
ble terms. The widely divergent views of the Amendment expressed in today's opinions
reveal the haze that surrounds this constitutional command.
11. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
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of human beings.' 2 In determining whether a penalty comported with
human dignity, Justice Brennan formulated a cumulative test: (1) "a pun-
ishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to the dignity of human
beings"; 3 (2) "the State must not arbitrarily inflict a severe punish-
ment";" (3) "a severe punishment must not be unacceptable to contempo-
rary society"; 5 and (4) "a severe punishment must not be excessive,"
excessive meaning "unnecessary.""
Justices Stewart and White, in concluding that the discretionary nature
of the statutes before the Court in Furman rendered them cruel and unu-
sual punishments, measured the statutes at least partially by the stan-
dards enunciated by Justices Brennan and Marshall. Justice Stewart con-
cluded that the death sentences, since they were not mandatory, were cruel
in the sense that they went beyond the punishments deemed necessary by
the legislatures." Justice White reasoned that since the death penalty was
imposed so infrequently it had lost any utilitarian value and thus was a"pointless and needless extinction of life."' 8
The dissenting Justices in Furman objected to the majority's assertion
that the Court has the authority to examine the efficacy of punishments
which the legislatures have deemed necessary." According to the dissent-
ing view, whether or not a given punishment was necessary has no bearing
on its constitutionality since this question was a matter of legislative pol-
icy. The Furman dissenters did not articulate a standard of judicial review
in the mode of Justice Brennan's four-part test. Although they rejected the
test of penological necessity as a proper constitutional measure of capital
punishment,2" the dissent implicitly embraced the balance of the Brennan
test as a proper standard of judicial review by measuring the death penalty
against it.21
12. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 271.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 274.
15. Id. at 277.
16. Id. at 279. Justice Marshall argued similarly that a punishment is cruel and unusual
for any of four distinct reasons: (1) if it "involve[s] so much physical pain and suffering that
civilized people cannot tolerate [it] . . . ."; (2) if the punishment has been previously
unknown; (3) if the punishment "is excessive and serves no valid legislative purpose;" or (4)
if "popular sentiment abhors" the punishment. Id. at 330-32.
17. Id. at 309.
18. Id. at 312.
19. Id. at 396-97 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 456 (Powell, J., dissenting).
20. Justice Powell did not reject the Court's power to strike down penalties as excessive
but limited the power to cases where the punishment is "grossly excessive" or "greatly
disproportionate." Id. at 458 (emphasis in original).
21. While accepting the notion that the cruel and unusual punishments clause "may ac-
1976]
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In Gregg, the plurality opinion was authored by Justices Stewart, Powell
and Stevens.22 Using reasoning adopted by the Justices in their separate
opinions in Furman, the plurality in Gregg concluded that the eighth
amendment was not a static concept, but rather "must draw its meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a matur-
ing society. 2 3 Thus an objective examination of contemporary standards
was relevant to the application of the eighth amendment.24 The plurality
made it clear, however, that the public concept of penological decency by
itself was an insufficient measure of the eighth amendment's limitations.'-
They noted as Justice Brennan had concluded in Furman," that a basic
concept underlying the eighth amendment was that a punishment must
accord with "'the dignity of man.' "27 The plurality then reasoned that to
comport with human dignity, a punishment must not be excessive, mean-
ing that it may neither be inflicted unnecessarily and wantonly nor may
it be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crimeY
The Gregg standard articulated by the plurality synthesized the stan-
dards of judicial review which represented the common ground for consti-
tutional debate in Furman. Thus, it may be presumed that the Gregg
yardstick has become the accepted measure of the eighth amendment's
judicial limitations. The difficulty with the standard, of course, is that
amorphous concepts such as "human dignity" and "evolving standards of
decency" frequently require the Court's members to rely upon their own
intuitive notions.
quire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice," (Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910); accord, Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)),
the dissent still argued that historical judicial acceptance supports capital punishment's
present constitutional status. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 380-82 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); id. at 421-28 (Powell, J., dissenting). See notes 33-36 infra and accompanying
text.
22. These three Justices represented the plurality in each of the five cases of the Gregg
series. Being appointed by President Ford in December, 1975, Mr. Justice Stevens was the
only Justice sitting who did not take part in the Furman decision.
23. 96 S. Ct. at 2925. This phrase, used by Chief Justice Warren in Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 101 (1958), is quoted consistently throughout both Furman and Gregg.
24. 96 S. Ct. at 2925.
25. The proscription of cruel and unusual punishments was designed to be a judicially
enforced limitation on the exercise of legislative power. This judicial limitation would be
meaningless if public opinion was the exclusive interpreter of the standards by which the
limitation operates. See The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HAav. L. REV. 1, 82-83 (1972).
26. See notes 12-16 supra and accompanying text.
27. 96 S. Ct. at 2925, quoting from Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
28. The new test provides-for greater legislative leeway by the use of the words "greatly
disproportionate." See note 20 supra.
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III. THE STANDARD APPLIED
A. The Role of the Courts
The Gregg plurality asserted the primacy of the judiciary in enforcing
the legal restraints of the eighth amendment." Nevertheless, the eighth
amendment must be enforced with an awareness that the Court's role was
circumscribed by the underlying presumption of legislative validity. 0 The
plurality reasoned that since part of its formulated constitutional test was
whether or not the public accepts capital punishment, the legislative
judgment should be accorded great weight since it adequately reflected
society's attitudes.3 ' This reasoning is suspect, however, since the
legislative judgment is merely one indicator, albeit a significant one, of
society's moral values. Moreover, the plurality stacked the deck in favor
of capital punishment at the outset by granting the legislative judgment
a presumption of validity which pervaded the other elements of the plural-
ity's eighth amendment standard. Judging whether a given penalty was
abhorrent to current social values or was excessive or disproportionate
becomes a meaningless exercise when approached with a presumption that
the penalty was none of these things. Further, there was precedent for the
Court's subjecting the legislative determination to a relatively strict level
of scrutiny. Justice Stone, in his oft-quoted footnote in United States v.
Carolene Products, 32 concluded that deference is not due a legislative
determination when a specific prohibition of the Bill of Rights is involved
and when the beneficiaries of that protection are unlikely to be able to
protect themselves, both of which elements are generally present in death
penalty cases.
B. Contemporary Standards of Decency
In Furman and Gregg, the Court's proponents of the constitutionality of
capital punishment drew upon historical and contemporary evidence to
demonstrate that the death penalty comported with current standards of
29. 96 S. Ct. at 2925-26.
30. "Therefore, in assessing a punishment selected by a democratically elected legislature
against the constitutional measure, we presume its validity." Id. at 2926.
31. "[L]egislatures, not courts, are constituted to respond to the will and consequently
the moral values of the people." Id., quoting from Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 383
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
32. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). The Court stated:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the constitu-
tion, such as those of the first ten amendments. . ..
Id. at 152-53 n.4.
1976]
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decency. 33 A recurring contention was that in rejecting eighth amendment
attacks on particular modes of execution, the Court had implicitly recog-
nized that capital punishment was not cruel and unusual.3 4 The argument
was not one for the application of the principle of stare decisis, since the
plurality recognized that the entire Court has "never confronted squarely
the fundamental claim that the punishment of death always. . . is cruel
and unusual in violation of the Constitution."3 5 It was simply an attempted
refutation of what Chief Justice Burger in Furman facetiously character-
ized as an asserted "instant evolution in the law."36
The plurality was on more solid ground, however, when it noted that
there were objective methods for measuring society's reaction to the death
penalty and that the result of employing this methodology showed that the
death penalty comported with modem standards of decency. First, societal
acceptance was deduced from the legislative response to Furman.3 7 The
legislatures of over thirty-five states enacted death penalty statutes in one
form or another after Furman.3 1 Second, to reinforce the notion that society
has accepted capital punishment, the plurality cited the results of both
public opinion polls and the statewide California referendum which re-
33. For a history of the prohibition of "cruel and unusual" punishment see Granucci, "Nor
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 839
(1969). See also Justice Marshall's opinion in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 316-28.
34. 96 S. Ct. at 2927. Supreme Court cases in which the mode of execution was dealt with
include McGautha v. California; 402 U.S. 183, 197-98 (1971); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v.
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890); Wilkerson v.
Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134-35 (1878). For a similar discussion see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
at 380-82 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
35. 96 S. Ct. at 2922-23.
36. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 382 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The argument is also
frequently made that capital punishment should enjoy a measure of current respectability
because it was accepted by the framers of the Constitution. 96 S. Ct. at 2927. At the time
the eighth amendment was ratified, capital punishment was a common sanction in every
state. Further, the explicit language of the fifth amendment contemplates the continued
existence of capital punishment with the words ". . . nor shall any person be subject for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V. This
argument, however, proves too much. No one would suggest that earcropping, a perfectly
acceptable penalty in 1789, is a legitimate penalty today. Further, the fifth amendment
double jeopardy clause uses the words "life or limb," but surely amputation could not be
legitimately prescribed as a punishment for crime. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 283 n.28
(Brennan, J., concurring).
37. 96 S. Ct. at 2928-29.
38. Id. See id. at 2928 n.23 for a listing of such states and their respective death penalty
statutes. The relative provisions of Virginia's mandatory death penalty statute are found in
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-10 (Repl. Vol. 1975), -31 (Cum. Supp. 1976). See note 94 infra for
reprint of text. Congress also enacted a death penalty statute in 1974 for aircraft hijacking.
Antihijacking Act of 1974, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1472(j), (n) (1976).
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sulted in negating the Supreme Court of California's ruling that the death
penalty violated that state's constitution. 9 Finally, borrowing from the
language of Witherspoon v. Illinois,"° that juries" 'maintain a link between
contemporary community values and the penal system ... ''"' the plu-
rality concluded that community values were clearly reflected by the total
of 460 persons who were subject to death sentences at the end of March,
1976.42
The dissents of Justices Brennan and Marshall in Gregg were but short
summaries of their respective Furman opinions. Both Justices noted that
their Furman opinions, for them, had current vitality. 3 Justice Brennan
adopted the argument which was a mainstay of Professor Anthony G.
Amsterdam's brief in Aikens v. California" and, subsequently, in both
Furman and Gregg. This persuasive argument was that public acceptance
of the death penalty should be measured by how society acts and not
simply by what society said either in its legislative enactments or through
public opinion polls.45 Amsterdam demonstrated that disuse of the death
penalty was objective proof that society has progressively rejected the
death penalty." It may still be argued, however, that society has acted, and
not just spoken by sentencing to death a significant number of offenders
since the 1972 Furman decision. However, since no convicted criminal has
been executed in this country since 1967, juries during the post-Furman
39. 96 S. Ct. at 2929. See also People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 152, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972). Commentators have suggested that polls such
as the one cited by the plurality, Harris Poll, June 1973, are defective because of their broad
questions, and also because when people are asked concrete questions which call for reflec-
tion, many of those who nominally approved of the punishment before change their answers.
These authors conclude that no data exist which accurately reflect public opinion on the
matter. See Vidmar & Ellsworth, Public Opinion and the Death Penalty, 26 STAN. L. REv.
1245 (1974).
40. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
41. 96 S. Ct. at 2929, quoting from Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. at 519 n.15.
42. Id. at 2929.
43. Id. at 2971 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 2973 (Marshall, J., concurring).
44. 406 U.S. 813 (1972). Aikens was dismissed by the Supreme Court due to the intervening
decision by the Supreme Court of California in People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d
880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972), invalidating California's death
penalty statute. See note 39 supra.
45. As Justice Brennan noted in Furman, "[t]he acceptability of a severe punishment is
measured, not by its availability, for it might become so offensive to society as never to be
inflicted, but by its use." 408 U.S. at 279.
46. Brief for Petitioner at 26-39, Aikens v. California, 406 U.S. 813 (1972). The statistics
bear out Professor Amsterdam's contention that society no longer finds the death penalty
palatable. This country's last execution took place in 1967. The following figures are from
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUsTIcE, ExECUTIONS 1930-1967 (National Prisoner Statistics Bull. No.
42, 1968):
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period may have perceived the death penalty as something which in fact
was often imposed but never inflicted. Certainly, informed juries were
aware that the death penalty was under constitutional attack. Finally,
since the capital punishment system diffused the responsibility for the
death penalty decision, it may not have been as difficult for a jury to
impose the death sentence as it would have been under a system of concen-
trated responsibility. 7
The plurality in Gregg measured societal acceptance of the death pen-
alty by a count of inmates subject to execution since Furman. However,
in determining whether a system of capital punishment is in violation of
the eighth amendment, the Court should examine results produced by that
system in the nation as a whole rather than in any one particular state or
group of states."8 While most of the states which have retained capital
sentencing statutes have inmates awaiting execution, the plurality's con-
clusion that the death penalty was uniformly accepted in this country was
somewhat undermined by the fact that of the 611 persons on death row as
of the day of the Gregg decision, approximately 81% were in the prisons of
just ten states.49
In Gregg, Justice Marshall repeated his Furman argument that the pub-
lic sentiment concerning the death penalty can only be gauged by what the
public would accept if it was fully informed as to the penalty's conse-
Year(s) Executions
1930-1939 annual average 1E
1940-1949 annual average 127
1950-1959 annual average 71
1960 56
1961 42
1962 47
1963 21
1964 15
1965 7
1966 1
1967 2
47. C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE 93 (1974).
The author suggests that the responsibility to execute is shared by grand juries, prosecutors,
juries and judges, courts of appeal and the executive. The awesome decision is more easily
made when each participant in the process perceives that the decision in fact will not ulti-
mately be made, or, if it will be made, it will be made by someone else.
48. White, The Role of the Social Sciences in Determining the Constitutionality of Capital
Punishment, 13 DUQUESNE L. REV. 279, 290 n.3 (1974).
49. N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1976, at 7, col. 7. The ten states were California, Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee and Texas.
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quences50 In Furman, Justice Marshall was criticized for positing a consti-
tutional argument based upon such speculative assumptions.5' Realizing
that post-Furman events "render[ed] the prediction of the views of an
informed citizenry an uncertain basis for a constitutional decision ... 52
Justice Marshall rejected the test of popular sentiment and declared that
the ultimate inquiry should be whether the death penalty was necessary
to accomplish legitimate legislative goals. 3 Judicial intuition most likely
compelled Justice Marshall to finally reject any notion of public sentiment
being the arbiter of constitutional standards. Nevertheless, by its wording,
the eighth amendment peculiarly mandates a judicial determination of
what those words popularly mean.54
C. Excessiveness
The burden of showing that the death penalty is unnecessary and, there-
fore, unconstitutional is a heavy one, since the plurality in Gregg would
invalidate a penalty only if it is "totally without penological justifica-
tion."55 The plurality stated that the death penalty was popularly regarded
as serving two principal social purposes: retribution and deterrence of
capital crimes by prospective offenders.5
50. 96 S. Ct. at 2973. A recent study has found that the American public is not well-
informed about the death penalty and that the opinions of an informed public would differ
from those of a public unaware of the consequences and effects of the death penalty. Id. See
Sarat & Vidmar, Public Opinion, The Death Penalty, and the Eighth Amendment: Testing
the Marshall Hypothesis, 1976 Wisc. L. REv. 171.
51. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 444 (Powell, J., dissenting).
52. 96 S. Ct. at 2973-74.
53. Id. at 2974.
54. The adjectives found in the eighth amendment to describe the prohibited punishments
-"excessive," "cruel" and "unusual"-can be construed in almost limitless fashion. These
are, however, the limiting terms employed by the amendment. See note 2 supra for the text
of the eighth amendment. Since these words can be construed so differently, the Court is
faced with interpreting them as it views their meaning or using their popular definitions. This
dilemma perhaps explains why the eighth amendment has been determined to draw its
meaning from evolving standards of decency (see Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958)), for this
standard, while requiring judicial review, also takes into account nonjudicial factors. See
notes 23-25 supra and accompanying text.
55. 96 S. Ct. at 2929-30.
56. Id. at 2930. In Furman, Justice Marshall listed four additional purposes conceivably
served by the death penalty: prevention of repetitive criminal acts, encouragement of guilty
pleas and confessions, eugenics and economy. 408 U.S. at 342. Justice Brennan in Furman
dealt with recidivism by noting that techniques of isolation can insure that a criminal does
not get free to reinflict crime on society. Id. at 300-01. Further, Justice Marshall noted that
data show "that murderers are extremely unlikely to commit other crimes either in prison or
upon their release." Id. at 355. He also concluded that eugenics and encouragement of guilty
pleas through the death penalty were constitutionally impermissible purposes. Id. at 355-56.
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The Gregg plurality noted that "capital punishment was an expression
of society's moral outrage" 7 at particularly heinous conduct and recog-
nized retribution by itself as a legitimate penological goal., The goal of
retribution for its own sake is questionable, since almost any form of pun-
ishment could be acceptable if it is an expression of society's moral out-
rage. 9 In fact, the plurality, as Justice Marshall noted,6" was making a
utilitarian argument in asserting that retribution was a legitimate goal.
First, retribution was said to be necessary to prevent a society which per-
ceives that the legal system has been unwilling to impose upon criminals
the punishment they deserve from taking the law into its own hands.' The
possibility of "vigilante justice,"6 however, was remote, as evidenced by
its nonoccurrence in the nine years since any capital offender was put to
death. 3 Second, the plurality suggested that the death penalty expressed
society's belief that certain crimes were intolerable, thereby reinforcing
moral values. 4 Justice Marshall reasoned that in reality this goal was not
effectively served by the death penalty, since it was unlikely that a citizen
concerned about conforming his conduct to society's standards would be
led to believe that murder was acceptable if the penalty was life imprison-
ment.6 5
The debate over the deterrent value of the death penalty continued after
Furman and undoubtedly has not been silenced by the Gregg opinions.6
Finally, Justice Marshall stated that the argument that it was cheaper to execute a capital
offender than to imprison him for life supports a capital sanction was fallacious, for it was
factually incorrect. Id. at 357.
57. 96 S. Ct. at 2930.
58. Id.
59. Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HAav. L.
REV. 1773, 1797 (1970).
60. 96 S. Ct. at 2976.
61. Id. at 2930.
62. Id.
63. See note 46 supra.
64. 96 S. Ct. at 2930.
65. Id. at 2976.
66. Several studies figured prominently in the Court's debate in Furman. Principally
among them were studies conducted by one of the leading authorities on capital punishment,
Thorsten Sellin. See, e.g., T. SELUN, THE DEATH PENALTY (1959); T. Sellin, Does the Death
Penalty in America Protect Municipal Police?, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 284, 301
(H. Bedau ed. 1968); T. Sellin, THE DEATH PENALTY, A REPORT FOR THE MODEL PENAL CODE
PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (ALl) (1959).
Since Furman, further studies have been completed on the death penalty's deterrent value.
See, e.g., Baldus & Cole, A Comparison of the Work of Thorsten Sellin and Isaac Ehrlich on
the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 170 (1975); Bowers & Pierce, The
Illusion of Deterrence in Isaac Ehrlich's Research on Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 187
(1975); Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death,
[Vol. 11:101
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Since the plurality has accorded a presumption of validity to legislative
determinations that the death penalty was necessary to deter crime, natu-
rally it was not predisposed to debate the merits of statistical data and
results which it asserted were thus far inconclusive.17 The plurality's ap-
proach is unfortunate in several respects. First, while unwilling to examine
in detail the results of the studies, the plurality nevertheless was willing
to assume that for many the death penalty was "undoubtedly . . . a
significant deterrent."68 Second, by not requiring a more exact correlation
between punishment and purpose, the Court has forever relegated the
debate over deterrence, insofar as its usefulness to the judiciary is con-
cerned, to an academic exercise.
Finally, the Gregg plurality stated what probably was popularly felt to
be the ultimately irrefutable justification for the legal infliction of death,
namely, "when a life has been taken deliberately by the offender, we can-
not say that the punishment is invariably disproportionate to the crime." 9
The notion that the offender should suffer the same fate as his victim was,
essentially, one of retribution and is, therefore, a questionable constitu-
tional concept. Obviously, making an offender suffer to the same degree
that his victim has suffered in the case of murder by torture would be
constitutionally impermissable. Yet, it has been frequently noted that
inmates suffer a torturous psychological existence while awaiting the out-
come of lengthy appellate proceedings.7 1
D. Discretionary and Mandatory Statutes
The Furman mandate was that death sentences could not be imposed
under sentencing procedures which created a risk that they would be in-
flicted arbitrarily or capriciously. 2 The Furman majority concluded that
the lack of sentencing standards in capital cases resulted in arbitrary sent-
65 AM. ECON. REV. 397 (1975); Peck, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Ehrlich
and His Critics, 85 YALE L.J. 359 (1976).
67. 96 S. Ct. at 2930-31.
68. Id. at 2931.
69. Id. at 2932. Importantly, the plurality noted that it was not addressing itself to the
question of whether capital punishment is a proportionate sanction where no victim has been
deprived of life. Id. at 2932 n.35.
70. Comment, The Death Penalty Cases, 56 CALIF. L. Rav. 1268, 1349-54 (1968).
71. This fact led the Supreme Court of California to conclude that the length of time
between the sentence and the execution "had in fact become the 'lingering death' which the
Kemmler Court conceded would be cruel in the constitutional sense." People v. Anderson, 6
Cal. 3d 628, 646, 493 P.2d 880, 892, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 164, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972).
See also Note, Mental Suffering Under the Sentence of Death: A Cruel and Unusual
Punishment, 57 IowA L. REv. 814 (1972).
72. 96 S. Ct. at 2932.
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encing.7 3 The Gregg response was a validation of sentencing statutes which
give the sentencing authority adequate information and guidance and
which compel the consideration of individual characteristics of the of-
fender and the circumstances of the crime.
Under the Georgia statute challenged in Gregg, a convicted capital
offender would be sentenced to life imprisonment unless the jury at a
separate evidentiary proceeding, following the verdict, found unanimously
at least one statutorily defined "aggravating circumstance. 7 4 Even if the
jury found an aggravating circumstance, it could still refrain from impos-
ing the death penalty after consideration of "any mitigating circumstances
. . .otherwise authorized by law. . . . Upon conviction, prompt review
by the Georgia Supreme Court was required in every case in which the
death penalty was imposed. The Georgia Supreme Court was supplied
with a report from the trial court in the form of a questionnaire designed
to disclose whether there was any doubt about the defendant's guilt, or
whether race played a role in the determination of guilt and sentencing.76
Finally, in deciding whether the death penalty should be carried out in a
given case, the court was required to examine whether the death sentence
was excessive in light of its use or disuse in similar cases. 7
The Gregg plurality recognized that some jury discretion will still exist
under the Georgia statute, yet the level of discretion was acceptable since
it was controlled by "'clear and objective standards.' ",71 It rejected the
petitioner's assertion that the statute failed to meet Furman's require-
73. In Furman, the majority's reliance on the discretionary nature of the statutes was
severely criticized by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist in light of the Court's
decision in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971). The Court in McGautha held that
a jury's imposition of the death penalty did not violate due process because the jury was given
discretion to decide between life and death. Some have found the cases distinguishable,
however, since McGautha focused on the imposition of death as a matter of legal process,
whereas Furman examined the impact of that process upon the defendant. The Supreme
Court, 1971 Term, 86 HAzv. L. REV. 1, 79 n.17 (1972). The distinction has been criticized as
too technical to be of significance. L. LEVY, AGAINST THE LAW 384 (1974).
74. The plurality did not compel but rather praised a bifurcated procedure as the "best
answer." 96 S. Ct. at 2933. Under this procedure, the offender is not sentenced until the
determination of guilt has been made. Otherwise information relevant to the question of
sentencing alone may prejudice the separate question of guilt.
75. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
76. Id. § 27-2537.
77. Id. The plurality felt that the provision for appellate review would serve as a check on
the random or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. If juries generally do not impose
the death penalty for a given crime, the appellate review assures that no defendant convicted
for that crime will suffer the death sentence. 96 S. Ct. at 2939-40.
78. 96 S. Ct. at 2936, quoting from Coley v. State, 231 Ga. 829, 834, 204 S.E.2d 612, 615
(1974).
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ments, since the "jury has the power to decline to impose the death penalty
even if it finds one or more statutory aggravating circumstances. ... "I'
The plurality noted that this misinterprets Furman, since all Furman
required was that if the decision to execute an offender were made, it must
be done so in a noncapricious manner."'
Since it may be presumed that Furman was not a disguised attempt to
outlaw capital punishment "by placing totally unrealistic conditions on its
use," ' the Georgia statute, for the most part, was an adequate response
to that decision. 2 As long as a capital sentencing statute requires consider-
ation of a discrete list of unambiguous factors, appellate review will assure
consistent non-arbitrary results.
In addition to validating Georgia's capital sentencing statute, the Court
also approved the death penalty statutes of FloridaO and Texas. 4 Under
Florida's statute, the trial judge, who was the sentencing authority, must
weigh eight statutory aggravating and seven statutory mitigating circum-
stances before determining whether the death penalty should be imposed."
The Florida statute differed from the Georgia law in that the sentence
was determined by the trial judge rather than by the jury. The Texas
capital sentencing procedure may have represented the greatest degree of
discretion which could be granted a capital sentencing jury without run-
ning afoul of Furman. In Texas, the jury was required to answer but three
questions in a proceeding that took place after a verdict finding a person
guilty of one of the specified categories of murder. 6 The plurality con-
79. Id. at 2939.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 2937 n.50.
82. The petitioner in Gregg argued that the use of the words "outrageously or wantonly
vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture or depravity of mind," GA. CODE ANN. §
27-2534.1(b)(7) (Cum. Supp. 1975), to characterize one of the aggravating circumstances
permits the jury such a broad range of discretion that the death sentence could be imposed
in any case. 96 S. Ct. at 2938. The plurality countered that the language need not be read so
broadly and that there is no reason to assume the Supreme Court of Georgia will adopt such
an open-ended construction. Id. The plurality's reasoning with respect to this provision of the
statute is tenuous, since Furman appears to have condemned capital sentencing statutes
which are both arbitrary in their application and on their face. Note, Discretion and the
Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty Statutes, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1690, 1696 (1974).
83. Proffitt v. Florida, 96 S. Ct. 2960 (1976).
84. Jurek v. Texas, 96 S. Ct. 2950 (1976).
85. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
86. TEXAS CODE CrIM. PROC., art. 37.071(b) (Cum. Supp. 1975). The three questions are:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant [causing] the death . . . was committed
deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or
another would result; (2) whether [it is probable] that the defendant would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and (3)
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cluded that although Texas has not adopted a list of statutory aggravating
circumstances, its action in narrowing the categories of murders for which
the death sentence could be imposed had the same effect."
Both North Carolina's"8 and Louisiana's"8 mandatory death penalty stat-
utes were held in Woodson v. North Carolina"8 and Roberts v. Louisiana'
to fall short of the eighth amendment imperative that in capital cases the
character and record of the offender and the circumstances of the
particular offense should be considered prior to sentencing." The North
Carolina statute imposed a mandatory death sentence upon any defendant
convicted of first degree murder. 3 The Louisiana statute mandated a
death penalty whenever a conviction was obtained for any one of five
categories of homicide, regardless of any mercy recommendation by the
jury.9 4
if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased
was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased.
87. 96 S. Ct at 2955. As the plurality noted, each of the five classes of murders made capital
offenses by the Texas statute was included as a statutory aggravating offense in Florida and
Georgia. Id. The plurality also concluded that a statute which allowed a sentencing authority
to consider only aggravating circumstances would fall short of providing the necessary indivi-
dualized sentencing determination. The Texas statute was saved, however, by the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals' interpretation of the second of the three questions which, as
interpreted, permitted a defendant to bring to the jury's attention whatever mitigating cir-
cumstances he may be able to show. Id. at 2956-57.
88. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975). The statute reads:
Murder in the first and second degree defined; punishment.-A murder which shall
be perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, torture, or
by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall be
committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery,
kidnapping, burglary or other felony shall be deemed to be murder in the first degree
and shall be punished with death. All other kinds of murder shall be deemed murder
in the second degree, and shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of not less
than two years nor more than life imprisonment in the State's prison.
89. LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
90. 96 S. Ct. 2978 (1976).
91. 96 S. Ct. 3001 (1976).
92. 96 S. Ct. at 2991.
93. See note 88 supra.
94. See note 89 supra. The statute defined first degree murder, for which the death penalty
was mandatory, as the killing of a human being:
(1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm and
is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated kidnapping,
aggravated rape, aggravated burglary or armed robbery; or
(2) When the offender has a specific intent to kill, or to inflict great bodily harm
upon, a fireman or a peace officer who was engaged in the performance of his lawful
duties; or
(3) Where the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm
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The plurality's arguments in Woodson were twofold. First, it was said
that contemporary standards have evolved to the point that mandatory
death sentences were no longer morally tolerable. Second, even if manda-
tory death sentencing was acceptable to society, it would fail to meet the
requirements of Furman. Mandatory statutes "have simply papered over
the problem of unguided and unchecked jury discretion,"95 by permitting
juries to convict or acquit based upon the same vague criteria that the
Furman majority found unacceptable to eighth amendment standards.
After sketching a history of mandatory capital punishment in America,
the Woodson plurality concluded that both jury nullification 6 and legisla-
tive enactments prior to Furman pointed to the repudiation of automatic
and has previously been convicted of an unrelated murder or is serving a life sentence;
or
(4) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon
more than one person; [or]
(5) When the offender has specific intent to commit murder and has been offered or
has received anything of value for committing the murder.
For the purposes of paragraph (2) hereof, the term peace officer shall be defined
and include any constable, sheriff, deputy sheriff, local or state policeman, game
warden, federal law enforcement officer, jail or prison guard, parole officer, probation
officer, judge, district attorney, assistant district attorney or district attorney's investi-
gator.
LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (Cum. Supp. 1976)
Virginia's death penalty statute is similar to that of Louisiana in that it prescribes death
in VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-10 (Repl. Vol. 1975) for anyone who commits a Class 1 felony. Class
1 felonies are defined in VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (Cum. Supp. 1976) as:
(a) The wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing of any person in the commission
of abduction, as defined in § 18.2-48, when such abduction was committed with the
intent to extort money, or a pecuniary benefit;
(b) The wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing of a human being by another for
hire; and
(c) The wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing by an inmate in a penal institu-
tion as defined in § 53-19.18, or while in the custody of an employee thereof.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
For a history of the evolution of death penalty statutes in Virginia see Note, Capital
Punishment in Virginia, 58 VA. L. REv. 97 (1972). For a discussion of proposed death penalty
legislation in Virginia after Furman see 9 U. RiCH. L. REv. 415 (1975).
Virginia's current capital punishment statute, as Louisiana's statute, contains no provi-
sions for the consideration of either aggravating or mitigating circumstances. On this basis,
the statute is most likely unconstitutional. While neither the Supreme Court nor the Su-
preme Court of Virginia has been presented with the issue since Gregg, one circuit court in
Virginia held in October that Virginia's death penalty statute did violate the Constitution, a
view shared by the state's Attorney General. On Oct. 14, 1976, Judge Carleton Penn issued
the appropriate order in the companion cases of Commonwealth v. Szafranski, No. 2328
(Loudoun Co. Cir. Ct., filed Oct. 14, 1976), and Commonwealth v. Julian, No. 2317 (Loudoun
Co. Cir. Ct., filed Oct. 14, 1976).
95. 96 S. Ct. at 2990.
96. Jury nullification is refusal by a jury to convict a defendant of a crime which carries
with it an automatic death sentence.
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death sentences. 7 It noted that with one exception no state prior to
Furman ever returned to a mandatory sentencing scheme after enacting
discretionary sentencing. Rather than ascribing their enactment to a"renewed societal acceptance"99 of mandatory death sentencing, the plu-
rality reasoned that the post-Furman mandatory statutes were attributa-
ble to diverse readings of the Court's "multi-opinioned decision" in
Furman.'"
The plurality's conclusion in Woodson that society has rejected
mandatory sentencing did not square with its willingness in the Gregg
opinions to defer to the states' legislative determinations concerning capi-
tal punishment. As Justice White noted in his dissent, the fact that legisla-
tures before Furman chose jury sentencing to avoid the problems of jury
nullification was not a legislative judgment that mandatory punishments
were excessively cruel.'0' While the states thus showed a preference for
discretionary sentencing, it was also true that they preferred mandatory
penalties to no death sentences at all." 2 Further, while the plurality found
proof of societal rejection of mandatory sentencing through jury nullifica-
tion, it did not adequately deal with the incontrovertible fact that since
Furman the death penalty has regularly been imposed under mandatory
statutes.' 3 Finally, it is not clear why the requirement that the individual
characteristics of the criminal and the crime be considered before sentenc-
ing may not be satisfied by a legislative judgment that the commission of
certain especially heinous crimes conclusively establishes the criminal's
character. 04 The plurality seriously undermined its position in this regard
by noting in Roberts that murder by a prisoner serving a life sentence was
a "unique problem" that could justify a mandatory death sentence.'10
The plurality's assertion in Woodson that the challenged North Carolina
statute was only cosmetically mandatory was well-founded. Juries in such
cases were permitted to base their decision as to guilt, and thereby as to
the death sentence, upon such amorphous concepts as premeditation and
deliberation.' The effect of this was to grant to juries the same level of
discretion that was condemned in Furman. The Louisiana statute nar-
rowed the categories of crime for which a death sentence must be im-
posed,107 thus eliminating the problem of vague and broad wording. Never-
97. 96 S. Ct. at 2986.
98. Id. at 2986 n.30.
99. Id. at 2989 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 3019 (White J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 2996 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 3019 (White, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 3018 (White, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 3006-07 n.9.
106. See note 88 supra.
107. See note 94 supra.
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theless, the plurality found that since juries were permitted to convict
capital defendants of lesser included offenses even though not warranted
by the evidence, they were effectively given the unbridled discretion which
the Furman majority condemned.' 8 Practically, it is difficult to mark the
distinction between this and guided discretionary statutes in which juries
are permitted to recommend mercy if they find the mitigating outweigh
the aggravating circumstances.
Justice Rehnquist argued that the plurality's insistence that there be
particularized consideration of relevant aspects of the defendant's
character was not buttressed by case authority."9 Whatever the merits of
that argument,"' the plurality is to be commended for finding that the
"fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendnfent""'
required that juries carefully consider all relevant factors before embarking
upon their awesome duty.
E. Systemic Discretion
Furman outlawed unfettered discretion in the capital sentencing pro-
cess. Many commentators have suggested that the discretion which was
condemned may be seen as extending beyond the jury phase into other
phases of the capital punishment system."' The plurality dealt briefly with
the petitioner's contention in Gregg that systemic discretion rendered any
imposition of a death sentence invalid by noting that Furman dealt with
the decision to impose the death sentence on a specific individual who had
been convicted of an offense, not with the decision to remove a defendant
from his inexorable march through the system to execution."' The decision
to render mercy in such cases, through executive clemency for example,
was not precluded by the Furman holding.' In practice, the weakness of
the plurality's position in Gregg is that some defendants may be removed
from the system due to decidedly arbitrary factors. For example, a prosecu-
108. 96 S. Ct. at 3007.
109. Id. at 2999 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
110. For authority the plurality cited among others Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55
(1937), in which the Court noted:
For the determination of sentences, justice generally requires consideration of more
than the particular acts by which the crime was committed and that there be taken
into account the circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensi-
ties of the offender.
96 S. Ct. at 2991.
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE
(1974); Note, Capital Punishment Statutes After Furman, 35 OHIO ST. L. REV. 651 (1974).
113. 96 S. Ct. at 2937.
114. Id.
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tor's decision to plea bargain with a capital offender may well depend on
his backlog of pending cases. Since under this sytem some defendants may
be executed for the same crimes for which other defendants have plea
bargained, the condemned defendant may perceive that he has been arbi-
trarily selected to die, and a perception of arbitrary selection by an individ-
ual defendant was condemned in Furman as cruel and unusual.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in the Gregg v. Georgia series of opinions adopted
an eighth amendment standard which encompassed the notion of judicial
analysis of public opinion and penological necessity. By assuming that the
legislatures adequately reflected the public's attitude toward the death
penalty and by granting a presumption of validity to the legislative judg-
ment as to capital punishment's necessity, the Court placed an over-
whelming burden upon the death penalty's opponents. Professor Amster-
dam's thesis that the true test of society's attitude was to be found in its
acts and not its enactments was rejected by the Court. Yet, with the
sanction of state judicial review of death sentencing to ensure that the
death penalty was not being imposed inconsistently, the Amsterdam thesis
has in essence been adopted for future death penalty cases. As to penologi-
cal necessity, legislatures should carefully examine recent data on deter-
rence before revamping unconstitutional statutes or permitting existing
capital punishment statutes to continue in effect. In the future, evolving
standards of decency may find that death is not a sufficient deterrent to
outweigh a distaste for retribution.
In the final analysis, the Gregg plurality reached a conclusion which
combined the desire to keep the death penalty as a viable punishment with
a fear of arbitrariness. The result was a capital sentencing standard which
fell within the outer parameters of a mandatory penalty on one hand and
a completely discretionary penalty on the other, but which combines ele-
ments of both. A statute cannot require the death penalty for it must
permit sentencers to take into account the nature of the crime and the
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circumstances of the offense. Yet, this discretion must be guided so that
its application is as uniform as possible." 5
James F. Stutts
115. The Virginia capital sentencing statute fails not because it grants sentencing authori-
ties unfettered discretion but because it does not permit sentencers to weigh aggravating and
mitigating circumstances before determining sentence. The approved Georgia statute has the
salient feature of including statute-defined aggravating circumstances, one of which
must be found before sentencing a defendant to death. While Virginia's mandatory approach
may appear on the surface to represent a harsher alternative, the Virginia statute does not
sanction, as does the Georgia statute, the death penalty for the offense of murder unless it is
by abduction, for hire or by a penal inmate. Since the legislature has already determined that
these are the only offenses for which the death penalty is appropriate, the new Virginia capital
sentencing statute should define these types of murder as statutory aggravating circumstan-
ces. To comply with the Court's opinion in Gregg, it would be necessary to permit the
defendant to demonstrate that mitigating circumstances outweigh any aggravating circum-
stances which may be found. Alternatively, Virginia may follow the Texas approach and
define these types of murders as the only offenses for which the death penalty may be
imposed, again permitting a showing of mitigating circumstances. In either case, a bifurcated
trial and sentencing procedure is preferable to a procedure in which both guilt and punish-
ment are determined simultaneously.
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